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THE DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF REAL AND
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN KENTUCKY
ANNE F. NoYEs*
Among the most important statutory provisions both from
the standpoint of the number of people that they affect and
from their social significance, are those which pertain to the
descent and distribution of real and personal property. Few
people comprehend fully their meaning, or the consequences
should they fail to execute a valid will.
These statutes vary greatly throughout the United States.
Such a statute is difficult to draw, as the circumstances are like-
ly to be different in each case that comes up. Yet, in drawing
it, the legislature must be somewhat arbitrary, and attempt to
draft one that will satisfy both social and individual interests.
It would appear that a balance between the two is the ideal
solution, but it is rare when this can be fully accomplished, and
in case of a conflict perhaps the social interests of the com-
munity in general must be made to prevail over the individual
interests.
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the first five sec-
tions of the statutes on descent and distribution in Kentucky;
cases which have been decided by the Court bearing upon their
interpretation and manner of application; and to show wherein
these statutes appear to work injustices and should, possibly, be
changed. The statutes of other states will be used and discussed
to show in what manner other states have met the problem, and
have felt it advisable to handle the subject. In anticipation, it
might be said that it appears that the Kentucky statutes on the
whole subject do not measure up to the present day standards
existing in many other states. The chapter in the Kentucky
statutes pertaining to this subject is numbered 391. One section
of the following chapter, 392.020, will te discussed in this con-
nection.
THE DESCENT op RAL PROPERTY nlT KENTUCKY
The first section which will be discussed is the one dealing
with the descent of real property. It is important that we have.
* A.B., Sweet Briar College, 1943; Candidate for the LL.B. de-
gree, University of Kentucky Law College, June, 1946.
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a picture of the statute in our minds when we talk about the
decisions pertaining to it, and the significance of its various
items. The Kentucky Revised Statutes, section 391.010, reads
as follows:
"When a person having right or title to any real
estate of inheritance dies intestate as to such estate, it
shall descend in common to his kindred, male and
female, in the following order, except as otherwise pro-
vided in this chapter:
"(1) To his children and their descendants; if
there are none, then
"(2) To his father and mother, if both are living,
one moiety each; but if the father is dead, the mother,
if living, shall take the whole estate; if the mother is
dead, the whole estate shall pass to the father; if there
is no father or mother, then,
"(3) To his brothers and sisters and their descend-
ants; if there are none, then
"(4) One moiety of the estate shall pass to the
paternal and the other to the maternal kindred, in the
following order;
"(a) The grandfather and grandmother equally, if
both are living; but if one is dead, the entire moiety
shall go to the survivor; if there is no grandfather or
grandmother, then
"(b) To the uncles and aunts and their descend-
ants; if there are none, then
"(c) To the great-grandfathers and great-grand-
mothers, in the same manner prescribed for grand-
father and grandmother by subsection (a); if there are
none, then
"(d) To the brothers and sisters of the grand-
fathers and grandmothers and to their descendants;
and so on in other cases without end, passing to the
nearest lineal ancestors and their descendants.
"(5) If there is no such kindred to one of the par-
ents as is described in subsection (4), the whole shall go
to the kindred of the other. If there is neither paternal
nor maternal kindred, the whole shall go to the husband
or wife of the intestate; or, if the husband or wife is
dead, to the kindred of the husband or wife, as if he or
she had survived the intestate and died entitled to the
estate."
Let us note first some of the rather obvious points about
this statute. It provides for the children of the decedent and
their descendants in its first subsection, but does not consider
the surviving spouse until all other kindred of the intestate have
had a chance to claim the property. There is no provision for
escheat to the state in this statute, and although there is an
escheat statute in Kentucky' it does not take effect until all pos-
'Ky. R. S. sec. 393.020.
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sible relatives of the decedent have had a chance to claim the
property.
Ellis v. Dixon2 illustrates the above point. There the plain-
tiff, a distant cousin of the decedent, who had never seen,
known, or communicated with him, attempted to prove her re-
lationship and thus cut off the wife's interest. Ample evidence
was presented by the wife and witnesses for her to the effect
that decedent had made the remark innumerable times that he
had no relatives in this country, or in England, which he had
left when a boy. The plaintiff, also of English birth, fortunate-
ly, was not able to prove her relationship to the decedent to the
satisfaction of the Court. Consider carefully, however, the
social and individual injustices which the Kentucky statute as
it now stands is capable of producing. It is absurd, to say the
least, for a statute to be so framed that a wife (or husband, as
the case may be) may be cut off with only a life interest in one-
third of her husband's real property, while a stranger may be
permitted to inherit a fee in the entire estate.
On interpretation of the wording of the statute, the Court
of Appeals has held that the words "real estate" or "land" as
used therein shall be construed to mean "lands, tenements, and
hereditaments and all rights thereto and interests therein, other
than a chattel interest." 3 "Moiety" as so used means one half
of the estate and not the whole thereof.4 The words "children"
and "issue" have also been interpreted to mean not only those
born in lawful wedlock of the intestate and another, but to in-
clude all children and issue as by law have been made capable
of inheriting from the intestate. 5 Thus one legally adopted by
A but not by A's subsequent wife could take from A but not
from his wife. However, while an adopted child is capable of
inheriting from the one who adopts him, the adoption does not
make him capable of inheriting from other persons who may
leave property that the adopting parent and his heirs legally
inherit under the statute.6 It has further held that children
'294 Ky. 609, 172 S. W. 2d 461 (1943).
3 Graves v. Spurr, 97 Ky. 651, 659, 31 S. W. 483, 485 (1895).4 Young v. Smithers, 181 Ky. 847, 205 S. W. 949 (1918).
'Drain v. Violett, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 155 (1867).,
'Sanders v. Adams, 278 Ky. 24, 128 S. W. 2d 223 (1939).
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adopted in other states under statutes similar to the Kentucky
statute may take under the Kentucky statute of descent3
While many states have abolished estates of dower and
curtesy,8 they still exist in Kentucky, 9 the surviving spouse be-
ing entitled to a life estate in one-third of all of the realty of
the intestate and to one-half of all of the personalty of the in-
testate absolutely. Other states which, like Kentucky, have
made no substantial provision for the surviving spouse under
their statutes of descent and distribution still provide for dower
and curtesy in varying amounts.' 0  Under the Kentucky
statute the Court has held that the children of an intestate
acquire an absolute fee in his lands, subject only to the life
interest of their surviving parent." Thus they may bring an
action of trespass against one who by contract with said sur-
viving parent has been given the right to enter upon the land
and cut trees thereon.'-
As would be expected, the persons who inherit under the
statute, while they take a fee in the lands, take it subject to any
liens thereon, such as those created by mortgages. 13 The statute
applies to all property of the intestate which he has not disposed
of by any will which he may have left. 14 Further, the Court
I Pyle v. Fischer, 278 Ky. 287, 128 S. W. 2d 726 (1939).
'CoLo. STAT. ANN. (1935) chap. 176, sec. 1; ANN. CODE OF GA.
(Park, 1914) sec. 3670 (curtesy abolished); IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns,
1933) see. 6-2353; REV. STAT. OF ME. (1930) chap. 89, sec. 8; CoMP.
STAT. OF NEB. (1929) chap. 30, sec. 104; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1941)
see. 31-123; N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW (Thompson, 1939) chap. 52, secs.
189, 190; ComP. LAWS OF N. D. (1913) sec. 4414; OKLA. STAT. (1941)
chap. 32, sec. 9; S. D. CODE (1939) sec. 56.0103; UTAH CODE ANN.
(1943) sec. 101-4-9; REV. STAT. OF WASH. (Remington, 1932) sec.
1343; WYo. REV. STAT. ANN. (1931) sec. 88-4001.
Dower and curtesy have also been abolished in England. Ad-
ministration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23, sec. 45 (1) (b), (c).
'Ky. R. S. secs. 392.020, 392.010.
'" STAT. OF ARK. (1937) secs. 80, 90; FLA. STAT. (1941) sec.
731.34 (dower only); ANN. CODE OF GA. (Park, 1914) sec. 5247
(dower only); CODE OF IOWA (1939) chap. 508, secs. 11990, 11991;
REV. STAT. of N. J. (1937), secs. 3:37-1, 3:37-2; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN.
(Page, 1938) sec. 10502-1; ORE. COmP. LAWS (1940) secs. 17-101,
17-401; GEN. STAT. OF N. C. (1943) secs. 30-4, 30-5, 52-16; TENN. CODE
ANN. (Williams, 1934) secs. 8351, 8353.
", Campbell v. Wells, 278 Ky. 209, 128 S. W. 2d 592 (1939).
"Kentucky Stave Co. v. Page, 125 S. W. 170 (Ky. 1910).
"3 Maxwell's Committee v. Cent. Per. Bldg. and Loan Associa-
tion, 131 Ky. 18, 114 S. W. 324 (1908).
"
4Fox v. Burgher, 285 Ky. 470, 148 S. W. 2d 342 (1941); Todd
v. Gentry, 109 Ky. 704, 60 S. W. 639 (1901).
L.J.-4
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has refused to uphold the doctrine of worthier title, so that
where a will devises property according to the statute of des-
cent the devisees take under the will and not under the statute. 15
Should all of the devisees under a will make an agreement that
the will should not be probated, so that they can have equal dis-
tribution of the estate among themselves, such an agreement is
valid and binding and they will take under the statute by virtue
of the agreement.' 6  If a testator should make a provision in his
will for a contingent reversion to his estate of certain property,
the provision is valid, and such property upon reverting to the
estate, becomes a part of the estate and passes according to the
statute of descent. 17
In Ellis v. Dixon,'s mentioned above, there is an interesting
exception to the hearsay rule, the Court admitting in evidence
declarations as to family pedigree and history when the de-
clarant was dead and was related by blood or affinity to the
family whose genealogy was under inquiry. The Court has also
held in Montz v. Schwabacher 19 that there is a legal presump-
tion that every decedent has heirs, but that it is rebuttable either
by lapse of time accompanied by the non-appearance of heirs,
or by proof of the fact that there are none. A mere unsupport-
ed statement that there are no heirs is not sufficient to rebut
such a presumption. 20 As to how long a time must elapse to
rebut the presumption that there are heirs is left in doubt in
this case. The wife of the decedent had been dead for five
years, and yet the Court stated that this was not "such lapse
of time as would rebut (the) . . . presumption" 2 1 that the wife
left heirs. Certainly this is a strange decision. It would seem
that if a person's relatives are not sufficiently interested in him
to make their whereabouts known before the lapse of a five year
period, they should deserve little consideration under this
statute. It appears to this writer that the stipulation that heirs
must appear within a reasonable time would be more judicious
" Copeland v. State Bank and Trust Co., 300 Ky. 432, 188 S. W.
2d 1017 (1945).
"See, Henry v. Spurlin, 277 Ky. 114, 125 S. W. 2d 992 (1939);
cf. Evans, Certain Evasive and Protective Devices Affecting Suc-
cession to Decedents' Estates (1933) 32 MIcH. L. REv. 478, 480.
"7Hardesty v. Coots, 287 Ky. 675, 155 S. W. 2d 8 (1941).
"294 Ky. 609, 172 S. W. 2d 461 (1943).
119 Ky. 256, 83 S. W. 569 (1904).
Ibid.
Id. at 260, 83 S. W. 569, 570.
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than to allow the settling of estates to be stalled over a long and
unnecessary period of time, for such a stalling may result in a
wasting or even loss of the estate. Perhaps it would not be in-
judicious to say that a reasonable time is one year; but regard-
less of how the term "reasonable" is interpreted, it should not
be so interpreted that a husband or wife would have to wait
longer than, or as long as, five years for the appearance of
heirs.
DISTRIBUTION PER STMPES
A statute which must be read in connection with the section
just considered is Kentucky Revised Statutes, section 391.040,
which is as follows:
"When any or all of a class first entitled to inherit
are dead, leaving descendants, such descendants shall
take per stirpes the share of their respective deceased
parents."
Kentucky is one of a very few states which have a provision
for per stirpes distribution, the other states being Arkansas, 2 2
Colorado,2 3 Delaware,2 4 Florida,2 5 and Rhode Island.26
Let us consider briefly just what is the import of such a
provision. Take for example, the case of one A, who dies with-
out a validly executed will, leaving surviving him ten grand-
children, the children of two deceased sons, B and C. One
grandchild is the child of son B, and the other nine grand-
children are the children of son C. Under this statute B's child
will inherit one half of all of the estate left by A, while the other
nine grandchildren will have to be content with one eighteenth
each of the total estate of A. The question immediately arises,
would the owner desire such a consequence? Presumably a
person has the same affection for one grandchild as he does for
another and would want them all to share equally in his estate
if all of his children have predeceased him. It would seem also
so far as collaterals are concerned that this statement would ap-
ply equally to a person's nieces and nephews should his brothers
and sisters all have predeceased him leaving issue entitled to in-
herit, as well as to all other cases in which the degree of relation-
2STAT. OF ARK. (1937) sec. 4338.
2'COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935) chap. 176, sec. 1.
"'REv. CODE OF DEL. (1935) sec. 3731.
" FLA. STAT. (1941) sec. 731.25.
"GEN. LAWS OF R. I. (1938) chap. 567, sec. 5.
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ship of all of the survivors who are entitled to inherit is equal,
and they are in the same class.
Some would argue at this point that had the decedent in-
tended that they should take other than by the statute he would
have left a will with his express directions in it. But this is a
fallacious and inconclusive argument as the very great majority
of the population do not understand the full import of these
statutes on descent, in fact, it is entirely possible that they do
not realize that such statutes exist. Even if they should so real-
ize, or think about it at all, they probably reason somewhat
along the line that the legislature and the courts support the
statutes, therefore they are correct and promote our best in-
terests. This writer offers as a maxim or general principle that
when the lineal heirs of a decedent are related to him in equal
degree, the inherited portions of all the heirs should be equal one
to the other. Respecting collateral inheritance per stirpes and
per capita, it would appear that the latter is generally adopt-
ed.27  It might be more difficult, however, to frame a maxim in
this case as we might sometimes wish to prefer one collateral to
another even though they stand in equal degree to the intestate.
Thus where an uncle and a nephew are the next of kin, it might
be desirable from a social and economic standpoint to prefer the
nephew to the uncle.
The large majority of the states have provided by statute
that where the heirs who are eligible to share under the statute
og descent are all of the same degree of relationship from the de-
cedent they will share equally, that is per capita, rather than per
stirpes, as in Kentucky.281
REPRESENTATION
Before we go further in our discussion it would be wise to
have a definition of the term "representation" clearly fixed in
our minds. It has been variously defined, and sometimes inac-
" ARIz. CODE ANN. (1939) chap. 39, sec. 108; PROBATE CODE OF
CALIF. (1937) secs. 221, 222; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) sec. 14-103;
IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) sec. 6-2302; REV. STAT. OF ME. (1930)
chap. 89, sec. 1; GEN. LAWS OF MASS. (1932) chap. 190, sec. 3; Comp.
LAWS OF MICH. (1929) sec. 13440; MINN. STAT. (1941) sec. 525.16;
N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW (Thompson, 1939) chap. 18, sec. 83;
GEN. STAT. OF N. C. (1943) sec. 28-149; TEX. STAT. (Vernon, 1936)
sec. 2577; VA. CODE ANN. (1942) sec. -5266; W. VA. CODE ANN. (1943)
sec. 4082.
29 Id.
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curately. 29  Many people confuse the term "representation"
with per stirpes distribution, but technically speaking, it is only
one phase of it. Thus if A dies and leaves a son B and two
grandchildren, the children of a deceased son C, the grand-
children will take the share of their parent, or one half of the
estate between them, while B will take the other'half. If, how-
ever, B is also deceased, and leaves a child, the three grand-
children of the decedent will all stand in equal degree to the de-
cedent and take as heirs in their own right and not by repre-
sentation of their parents, as the two grandchildren took in the
first example. Such a taking by the grandchildren, in the second
example, may be either per capita or per stirpes, but it is not
by representation. 'To state it another way, when one or more
persons stand in the place of another, as an heir, or in the
right of succeeding to an estate of inheritance, they are said to
represent that person who was entitled to inherit. Representa-
tion means the standing in the shoes of one's deceased parent
and so is always lineal, though the inheritance might be from a
collateral source. It runs vertically and not horizontally, so that
a brother, for instance, can not stand in the shoes of a deceased
sister, and take her share. There is a theory of per stirpes dis-
tribution which holds that there is no taking per stirpes except
where there are different generations to take.30 This theory
however, is probably not the usual one, and very definitely
is not the one adhered to in Kentucky.
Under the English law, prior to 1926, even the collateral
descendents of an intestate to the remotest degree, as in Ken-
tucky, stood in the place of their parent or ancestor, and took
per stirpes the share which he or she would have taken.31 This
rule was changed by the Administration of Estates Act of
1925 so that today in England all members of a class share
'Compare 26 C. J. S., Descent and Distribution, sec. 23 (taking
by representation means taking per stirpes), with 16 AM. Jun.,
Descent and Distribution, sec. 42 and White, Per Stirpes or Per
Capita (1939) 13 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 298, 300 citing Reeve, DESCENT
(1825) Introduction, p. 14 ("When the claimants are all in the same
degree of kindred, they take as next of kin, but when one or more
of the claimants are more remote than others in kindred, they take
by representation, per stirpes, what their parents would have
taken.").
"White, Per Stirpes or Per Capita (1939) 13 U. OF CIN. L. REV.
298, 299.
10 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (2d ed., 1933) 602.
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equally, and the share of any lineal descendant who predeceases
the testator is taken by his children or remoter issue equally,
among them per stirpes, but contingent upon their attaining the
age of twenty-one, or marrying thereunder. 32
The rule as to representation varies in this country,3 3 and
can be classified as follows:
(1) A number of the states provide that there shall be
representation only among lineal descendants. 3 4
(2) Others provide that there shall be representation among
lineal descendants, but among collaterals only with the issue
of brothers and sisters and not further. 35
(3) Pennsylvania follows the last rule, but also allows
representation among the children of uncles and aunts. 36
(4) Georgia provides that there shall be no representation
further than the grandchildren of collaterals.37
It is the opinion of this writer that the rule stated in the
second category is a desirable one, and that it will work the
justice that is required.
DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN THE WHOLE AND TE HALF BLOOD
Yet another section in this chapter on descent and distri-
bution in the Kentucky Revised Statutes seems not to produce
the fairest results. It is numbered 391.050 and reads as follows:
"Collaterals of the halfblood shall inherit only half
as much as those of the wholeblood, or as ascending
kindred, when they take with either."
The English Canons of Descent excluded the half blood
entirely,38 but the civil law gave an equal share to the whole
'Id. at 582, note (h). England: Administration of Estates Act,
1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23, sec. 47 (1) (i).
For a good discussion of the various statutes in this country
on the subject of representation see, 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAnmmy
LAWS (1936) 112-128.
3'ANN. CODE OF MD. (Flack, 1939) art. 93, secs. 134, 137, 138;
REV. STAT. MO. (1939) sec. 310; REV. CODES OF MONT. ANN. (1935)
sec. 7073; COMP. STAT. OF NEB. (1929) chap. 30, sec. 102; NEV. COMP.
LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) sec. 9859; ComP. LAWS OF N. D. (1913) sec.
5743; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) sec. 10503-4; ORE. COMP.
LAWS (1940) sec. 16-101; S. D. CODE (1939) sec. 56.0104; UTAH CODE
ANN. (1943) sec. 101-4-5; WIS. STAT. (1943) sec. 237.01.
" CODE OF ALA. (1940) chap. 16, secs. 2, 3; ILL. REV. STAT. (1937)
chap. 39, sec. 1; Miss. CODE ANN. (1942) sec. 468; REV. LAWS OF N. H.
(1942) chap. 360, sec. 3; N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW (Thompson,
1939) chap. 18, sec. 83; CODE OF LAWS OF S. C. (1942) sec. 8906.
'PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) chap. 20, sec. 67.
"
7 ANN. CODE OF GA. (Park, 1914) sec. 3931.
" ATKINSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WILLS (1937) 34-35.
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and half blood.-" Most of the states provide that relations of
the half blood shall share equally with those of the whole blood ;40
while some of the states following the above rule make an excep-
tion in the case of property which came to the decedent by way
of gift, devise, or bequest from one of the ancestors of the de-
cedent, in which case all those of the half blood on whose side
the relationship did not exist are excluded.41 Some statutes ex-
clude the heirs of the half blood if there are heirs of the whole
blood living.4 2 (This may well raise the question of how far
representation is, or should be, carried under such a statute.)
Only a few of the states provide, like Kentucky, that those of
the half blood shall take only one half the share of those of the
whole blood.43 Even these states differ from the Kentucky
statute, however, in that it applies only to collaterals of the half
blood.
Which of the states seem to have the best statute on the
manner of sharing between those of the whole and those of the
half blood? All sorts of cases and circumstances are conceiv-
able. Suppose that A and B are half brothers, C is A's brother
of the whole blood and B's brother of the half blood. There
is only a year's difference in their ages. They are raised
together, and are as close to one another as brothers of the whole
blood. Why should A and B not share equally in the estate
of C regardless of the source of C's property? It is the opinion
of this writer that there should be no distinction in the share
that the whole and the half blood take in a decedent's estate
"Id. at 35.
"STAT. OF ARK. (1937) sec. 4349; ILL. REV. STAT. (1937) chap. 39,
sec. 1; GEN. STAT. OF KAN. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) sec. 22-128; REV.
STAT. OF ME. (1930) chap. 89, sec. 2; ANN. CODE OF MD. (Flack, 1939)
art. 93, see. 138; GEN. LAWS OF MASS. (1932) chap. 190, sec. 4; N. Y.
DECEDENT ESTATE LAW (Thompson, 1939) chap. 18, sec. 83; COMP.
LAWS OF N. D. (1913) sec. 5752; OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938)
sec. 10503-4; OKLA. STAT. (1941) chap. 84, sec. 222; ORE. COMP. LAWS
(1940) sec. 16-204; S. D. CODE (1939) sec. 56.0113; UTAH CODE ANN.
(1943) sec. 101-4-17; PuB. LAWS OF VT. (1933) sec. 2967; WIS. STAT.
(1943) sec. 237.03; Wyo. REV. STAT. ANN. (1931) sec. 88-4003.
" CODE OF ALA. (1940) chap. 16, sec. 5; PROBATE CODE OF CALIF.
(1937) sec. 254; Corvip. LAWS OF MICH. (1929) sec. 13444; MnN. STAT.
(1941) sec. 525.17.
4 2 GEN. STAT. OF CONN. (1930) sec. 4982; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns,
1933) sec. 6-2306; REV. STAT. OF N. J. (1937) secs. 3:3-5, 3:3-7.
'ARIz. CODE ANN. (1939) sec. 39-105; FLA. STAT. (1941) sec.
731.24; REV. STAT. MO. (1939) sec. 309; TEX. STAT. (Vernon, 1936)
see. 2573; VA. CODE ANN. (1942) sec. 5265.
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regardless of source, whether they are lineal or collateral rela-
tfions.
ANCESTRAL ESTATES
Yet. another section of the Kentucky statutes on descent
which is likely to bring about an undesirable social and indi-
vidual result is the one which pertains to ancestral estates.44 It
is numbered 391.020 and reads as follows:
"(1) When a person dies intestate and without
issue, owning real estate of inheritance which is the
gift of either of his parents, the parent who made the
gift, if living, shall inherit the whole of such estate.
"(2) If an infant dies without issue, having the
title to real estate derived by gift, devise or descent
from one of his parents, the whole shall descend to that
parent and that parent's kindred, and if there is none,
then in like manner to the other parent and his kindred.
The kindred of one parent shall not be so excluded by
the kindred of the other parent, if the latter is more
remote than the grandfather, grandmother, uncles and
aunts of the intestate and their descendants."
No other state seems to have a provision quite like this
one, although Rhode Island has a similar provision which states
that where property is acquired by gift, devise, or descent from
a parent or other kindred, it shall descend to the blood of that
kindred.45 A number of states, however, do have provisions
to the effect that should an infant inherit from one of his
parents and then die under age, that the property so inherited
will descend to the children of such parent and their heirs by
representation.4 6
Let us consider briefly whether the Kentucky statute is one
which will bring about a desirable result, and some of the situa-
tions that are likely to arise under it. For example there is
A, an infant, who inherits land from his father. A dies and
leaves no issue, but leaves a mother who has no property and
little means of supporting herself. A's paternal grandparents
are not living, and his aunts and uncles on the paternal side all
"For a discussion of this subject in Kentucky, see, Evans, The
Ancestral Estate Law of Kentucky (Sept., 1943) 7 Ky. STATE BAR
J. 15.
41 GEN. LAWS OF R. 1. (1938) chap. 567, sec. 6.
'"MINN. STAT. (1941) sec. 525.16; REV. CODES OF MONT. ANN.(1935) sec. 7073; COMP. STAT. OF NEB. (1929) chap. 30, sec. 102;
NEV. COMP. LAWS (1929) sec. 9859; COMP. LAWS OF N. D. (1913)
sec. 5743; OKLA. STAT. (1941) chap. 84, sec. 213; S. D. CODE (1939)
sec. 56.0104; REV. STAT. OF WASH. ANN. (Remington, 1932) sec. 1341;
Wis. STAT. (1943) sec. 237.01.
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have substantial incomes. Under the above statute said uncles
and aunts will take the property inherited by A from his father,
and his mother, who is closer to him and more in need of aid
than the said uncles and aunts, will not be allowed any part of
the property so inherited from the father. Regardless of
economic circumstances, it seems only proper and fair that the
close blood relative should take in preference to the more re-
mote relative. While the situation depicted may seem to be
extreme there have been cases presenting these facts and the
decision suggested. 47
A fairly recent Kentucky case gave to the paternal grand-
mother at the death of an infant grandson, whose father and
grandfather had predeceased him, all of his'property which he
nad inherited from his father to the exclusion of his mother.48
It has also been held that where land comes from the father,
the paternal cousins will be preferred to half brothers and sisters
on the maternal side;49 and that where land descends from
the mother a maternal grandfather will be preferred to a
father.5 0
Absurd results are reached if such a statute is strictly
adhered to, as it apparently is in Kentucky. It would appear
to be a good example of the remaining elements of the common
law theory of descent of land which still persist in outmoded
parts of our law today. Is it necessary to carry them on when
the purposes for which they were created no longer exist? Cer-
tainly it can reasonably be said that in the greatest number
of cases an infant's surviving parent is closer to him than his
uncles or aunts or his grandparents and their heirs, and it
seems fairer to allow the surviving parent to inherit even
though the land may have descended from the infant's de-
ceased parent. Had the infant,51 or major intestate, as the,
" Lamar v. Crosby, 162 Ky. 320, 172 S. W. 693 (1915); Weisiger
v. McDonald, 116 Ky. 862, 76 S. W. 1080 (1903).
'
3Carr v. Hart, 232 Ky. 37, 22 S. W. 2d 432 (1929).
"Pulliam v. Parriss, 187 Ky. 844, 220 S. W. 1075 (1920).
"Carr v. Hart, 232 Ky. 37, 22 S. W. 2d 432 (1929); Connell v.
Cantrill, 202 Ky. 406, 259 S. W. 1017 (1924).
"Ky. R. S. sec. 394.030 reads, "No person under twenty-one
years of age can make any will, except in pursuance of a power
specially given to that effect, and except also, that a father, though
under twenty-one years of age, may by will appoint a guardian
for his child." As to the power of infants generally to make wills,
see 1 PAGE, THE LAW OF WILLS (1926) secs. 128, 129.
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case may be, wished to will realty which had descended to
him from a parent to other than those relatives specified in the
above statute, he might legally have done so, in fact, he probably
would have done so had he understood this statute.
As stated by Dean Evans, the statute appears "... to be
wholly out of harmony with present day concepts . . . (and)
should be blotted out and remembered again no more for-
ever. "52
INHERITANCE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
-While many of the states combine their statutes on the
descent of real and personal property,5 3 there are many of the
states which have some sort of variation between the tw6. Thus
Kentucky Revised Statutes, section 391.030, reads:
"(1) Where any person dies intestate as to his
personal estate, or any part thereof, the surplus, after
payment of funeral expenses, charges of administration
and debts, shall pass and be distributed among the same
persons, and in the same proportions, to whom and in
which real estate is directed to descend, except as
follows:
"(a) The personal estate of an infant shall be dis-
tributed as if he had died after full age.
"(b) An alien may be a distributee as though he
were a citizen.
"(c) Personal property or money on hand or in
bank to the amount of $750 shall be exempt from dis-
tribution and sale and shall be set apart by the apprais-
ers of the estate of an intestate to his widow and infant
children, or, if there is no widow, to his infant children
surviving him. A like amount of property or cash shall
52 Supra note 44.
'ARiz. CODE ANN. (1939) chap. 39, secs. 101, 102; STAT. OF ARK.
(1937) sec. 4338; PROBATE CODE OF CALIF. (1937) secs. 201, 201.5
(as to community property), secs. 221-236 (as to separate property);
COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935) chap. 176, sec. 1; GEN. STAT. OF CONN.
(1930) secs. 4980, 4982; FLA. STAT. (1941) sec. 731.23; ANN. CODE OF
GA. (Park, 1914) sec. 3931; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) sec. 14-103;
ILL. REV. STAT. (1937) chap. 39, sec. 1; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933)
secs. 6-2301, 6-2324; CODE OF IOWA- (1939) chap. 508, sec. 11986;
GEN. STAT. OF KAN. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) sec. 22-130; REV. STAT. OF
ME. (1930) chap. 89, sec. 20; ANN. CODE OF MD. (Flack, 1939) art.
46, sec. 1; GEN. LAWS OF MASS. (1932) chap. 190, sec. 2; MINN. STAT.
(1941) sec. 525.16; Miss. CODE ANN. (1942) sec. 472; REV. STAT. MO.
(1939) sec. 306; REV. CODE OF MONT. ANN. (1935) sec. 7072; N. Y.
DECEDENT ESTATE LAW (Thompson, 1939), chap. 18, sec. 83; GEN.
STAT. OF N. C. (1943) sec. 28-149; ComP. LAWS OF N. D. (1913) sec.
5743; OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) sec. 10503-4; ORE. COMP.
LAWS (1940) sec. 16-102; CODE OF LAWS OF S. C. (1942) sec. 8906;
S. D. CODE (1939) sec. 56.0104; TEX. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) sec. 2570;
Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1931) sec. 88-4001. C.
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be exempt from distribution and sale and shall be set
apart by the appraisers to the surviving infant children
of a widow who dies intestate.
"(2) The appraisers shall state in their appraise-
ment the money or the articles and value of each, set
apart by them to the widow or infants, separately from
the articles appraised for sale. If the widow or anyone
authorized by her in writing is present at the time of
the appraisement, she may make her selection out of
the property appraised to the amount of $750 and the
appraisers shall so report.
"(3) This section applies to cases where the hus-
band dies testate and the widow renounces the pro-
visions of the will as provided by KRS 392.080."
Supplemental to this statute is that part of Kentucky Re-
vised Statutes, section 392.020, which provides:
".. . The survivor (of either husband or wife) shall
also have an absolute estate in one-half of the sur-
plus personalty left by the decedent."
Subsection (1) (c) of the personal property statute above
is applicable only to widows and not to widowers. 54 It has been
further stated by the Court that the two sections quoted above do
not conflict with one another, as the surplus personalty provided
for in 392.020 is that personalty remaining after the debts,
funeral expenses, and widow's exemption have been deducted
from the estate.5 As to whether the exemption or the funeral
expenses will prevail should the personalty not be sufficient to
cover them both, it has been held that the widow's exemption
prevails over the claim for funeral expenses.5 6 Also property
set aside for the widow cannot be subjected to the payment
of the debts of the intestate.57 However, property of the deced-
ent which was attached by creditors of the decedent during his
lifetime, and which was not exempt from execution, is not sub-
ject to the widow's allowance of $750. 58
WHO ARE INFANT CHILDREN?
In interpreting the words in the personal property statute,
the Court has held that the words "infant children" mean the
Hamilton's Adm'r v. Riney, 140 Ky. 476, 131 S. W. 287 (1910).
rTalbott Ex'r. v. Goetz, 286 Ky. 504, 151 S. W. 2d 369 (1941).
" Blades v. Blades' Adm'r, 289 Ky. 556, 159 S. W. 2d 407 (1942).
"Thompson v. Thompson, 117 Ky. 526, 78 S. W. 418 (1904).
" Blake v. Durrell Bros., 103 Ky. 600, 45 S. W. 883 (1898).
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children of the intestate and not his stepchildren.59 By the
words "widow and children" it has been said that the legis-
lature intended both the widow and the children to benefit.60
It has further been held that the legislature intended that the
widow should have supervision and control of the exempted prop-
erty, unless an equitable reason exists to the contrary, such as
circumstances, without the fault of the children, which will de-
prive them of the use of their shares. 61 Such circumstances were
found in the Eversole caSe,62 where the mother was in prison,
and in the Landrum case,0 3 where the property was sold and the
mother and sons were no longer able to maintain a home and to
enjoy the exempted property together. It has been held, however,
that where the widow maintains a home to which the children
have access, but the children do not wish to use the home, then the
widow is entitled to all of the exempted property.64
SHOULD LEGISLATION BE PROGRESSIVE?
Having discussed generally the various sections of the
statute of descent and distribution with which this paper is
concerned, the general holdings of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals upon them, and having imagined some of the situ-
ations that are likely to arise under them, let us consider the
advisability of changing the order of descent of both real and
personal property, as well as the question respecting the point
at which representation should cease and the property should
escheat to the state, if, in fact, it should escheat.
It is in this matter that we find the greatest amount of di-
versity in the statutes of the various states. As has been pointed
out in this paper maiiy of the states have provisions differing
fundamentally from each other in regard to the descent of real
and personal property. What should be the governing criteria?
It is apparent that the states which make a distinction between
the order of descent of realty and personalty, are those that
allow the surviving spouse no substantial share in the realty,
and yet their legislatures seem to have felt that he should share
5 Howland's Adm'r v. Harr, 123 Ky. 732, 97 S. W. 358 (1906).
'Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S. W. 487 (1916).6t Crain v. West, 191 Ky. 1, 229 S. W. 51 (1921).
" Supra note 60.
'Landrum v. Landrum, 187 Ky. 196, 218 S. W. 717 (1920).
"' Berger v. Berger, 264 Ky. 229, 94 S. W. 2d 620 (1936).
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION
to some extent and therefore allow him to share to a larger
extent in the personalty.05 The question raised here is: is this
a wise or just way to handle the matter? Frankly speaking,
does the personal property statute cover up, or compensate for,
the defects of the statute on the descent of real property? Per-
haps it can be explained by saying that such statutes are a carry
over from the common law theory of the descent of real and
personal property. A man's wealth in past centuries was prin-
cipally in land. Feudal burdens fell upon the land owner, in
the interest of the feudal overlord. Few men owned personalty
of large value, and the stress, therefore, was upon realty where
there was tenure. Although the law is properly conservative
and slow to change, yet it cannot afford to be so conservative
and slow to change that it defeats progressive concepts of social
and individual justice. It should be a steadying force in society,
should guide it and protect those activities which will make for
the security of transactions and the interest of the person; yet
it should also be ready to make changes and improvements when
the social order requires that changes and improvements should
be made. In the situation under discussion, however, the law
as it stands, does not appear to be handicapped by wilful legis-
lative neglect, but rather by a legislature whose concern is
largely directed to political and economic measures.
The order of descent in the various states is almost as
varied as the number of states. This possibly is due to some
extent to the difficulty of drawing up a statute which will con-
sider the best interests of the individual and of society in gen-
eral; perhaps largely to the fact that legislatures throughout
the country are too busy with political issues to give adequate
consideration to an issue which, in reality, does significantly
affect the general interests of the people. ". . Even pride in
the ancestry of these laws no longer argues for their retention,
because most of the outgrown provisions of our land law in-
herited from England have been abolished by that country." 66
WCODE OF ALA. (1940) chap. 16, secs. 1, 10; REV. CODE OF DEL.
(1935) secs. 3731, 3847 (wife only); GEN. LAWS OF R. I. (1938) chap.
567, sec. 9 (wife only); VA. CODE ANN. (1942) sec. 5273; W. VA. CODE
ANN. (1943) sec. 4089; Wis. STAT. (1943) sec. 318.01.
*'McCall and Langston, A New Intestate Succession Statute for
North Carolina (1933) 11 N. C. L. REV. 266.
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SmA.RE, OF Tm SuRvIVING SPOUSE
In regard to the amount the issue and the surviving spouse
of a decedent are allowed to take, and at what point in the
order of succession they may take, the statutes are capable of
being classified to some extent as follows:
(1) A large number of the states -provide first for a di-
vision of the realty equally among the children of the intestate
and their issue by representation. 67
(2) A number of states allow the surviving spouse to take
one half the realty of the intestate absolutely in the first in-
stance if there is only one child or the issue of one child.0 8
(3) A still larger number of states, under varying stipula-
tions, allow the surviving spouse to take one third of all the
realty absolutely. 69
' Coi5E OF ALA. (1940) chap. 16, sec. 1; STAT. OF ARK. (1937)
sec. 4338; REV. CODE OF DEL. (1935) sec. 3731; ILL. REV. STAT. (1937)
chap. 39, sec. 1; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) sec. 6-2301; Miss.
CODE ANN. (1942) sec. 468; REV. STAT. MO. (1939) sec. 306; REV.
LAWS OF N. H. (1942) chap. 360, sec. 1; REV. STAT. OF N. J. (1937)
sec. 3:3-2; ORE. COMP. LAWS (1940) sec. 16-101; GEN. LAWS OF R. 1.
(1938) chap. 567, sec. 1; TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) sec.
8380; VA. CODE ANN. (1942) sec. 5264; W. VA. CODE ANN. (1943) sec.
4080; WIs. STAT. (1943) sec. 237.01.
" PROBATE CODE OF CALIF. (1937) sec. 221; IDAHO CODE ANN.
(1932) sec. 14-103; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) sec. 6-2314 (wife
only); MINN. STAT. (1941) sec. 525.16; REV. CODES OF MONT. ANN.
(1935) sec. 7073; COMP. STAT. OF NEB. (1929) chap. 30, sec. 101;
NEV. COMP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) sec. 9859; ComP. LAWS OF N. D.
(1913) sec. 5743; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) sec. 10503-4;
OKLA. STAT. (1941) chap. 84, sec. 213; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) chap.
20, sec. 1; S. D. CODE (1939) sec. 56.0104; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943)
sec. 101-4-5; PuB. LAWS OF VT. (1933) sec. 2951; REV. STAT. OF WASH.
ANN. (Remington, 1932) sec. 1341.
'PROBATE CODE OF CALIF. (1937) sec. 221; IDAHO CODE ANN.
(1932) sec. 14-103; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) sec. 6-2313; ANN.
CODE OF MD. (Flack, 1939) art. 93, sec. 129; GEN. LAWS OF MASS.
(1932) chap. 190, sec. 1; COMP. LAWS OF MICH. (1929) sec. 13440;
MINN. STAT. (1941) sec. 525.16; REV. CODES OF MONT. ANN. (1935)
sec. 7072; COMP. STAT. OF NEB. (1929) chap. 30, sec. 101; NEV. COMP.
LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) sec. 9859; REV. LAWS OF N. H. (1942) chap.
359, secs. 11, 13; N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW (Thompson, 1939)
chap. 18, sec. 83; GEN. STAT. OF N. C. (1943) sec. 28-149 (widow
only); ComP. LAWS OF N. D. (1913) sec. 5743; Omio GEN. CODE ANN.
(Page, 1938) sec. 10503-4; OKLA. STAT. (1941) chap. 84, sec. 213;
PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) chap. 20, sec. 2; CODE OF LAWS OF S. C.
(1942) sec. 8906; S. D. CODE (1939) sec. 56.0104; UTAH CODE ANN.
(1943) secs. 101-4-3, 101-4-5; PUB. LAWS OF VT. (1933) secs. 2951,
2964; REV. STAT. OF WASH. ANN. (Remington, 1932) sec. 1341.
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(4) Some of the states allow the spouse to take the same
share that the children take, dividing it equally among them. 70
(5) Three states allow the spouse to take all of the prop-
erty absolutely if there are no issue or their children, and no
parents.71
(6) A few of the states allow the surviving spouse to take
the whole of the realty and personalty absolutely if there are
no lineal descendants. 7 2
(7) A number of the states give the whole to the spouse
if there are no children, parents, brothers, or sisters or their
issue.73
(8) Two of the states leave out the final category in the
grouping above and give the whole to the spouse if there are
no children, parents, brothers, or sisters.74
There are still other variations as to just when the sur-
viving spouse is entitled to share, the opposite extreme from
those already mentioned being found in the statutes of those
states, which, like Kentucky, do not allow the spouse to take
the land in fee unless there are no other heirs whatsoe'ver.75
"FLA. STAT. (1941) sec. 731.23; ANN. CODE OF GA. (Park, 1914)
sec. 3931 (unless shares exceed five, then wife takes one fifth), sec.
3930 (husband shares equally with children, per stirpes with their
descendants); Miss. CODE ANN. (1942) sec. 470; GEN. STAT. OF N. C.(1943) sec. 28-149 (if more than two children and applicable only
to widows); TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) sec. 8389 (per-
sonalty only).
"Aaiz. CODE ANN. (1939) chap. 39, sec. 102; IDAHO CODE ANN.
(1932) sec. 14-103; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) sec. 6-2324; Wis.
STAT. (1943) sec. 237.01 (whole of realty to surviving spouse if no
issue).
72 CoLo. STAT. ANN. (1935) chap. 176, sec. 1; FLA. STAT. (1941)
sec. 731.23; ANN. CODE OF GA. (Park, 1914) see. 3931 (wife only);
MINN. STAT. (1941) sec. 525.16; Miss. CODE ANN. (1942)"sec. 470;
REV. STAT. OF N. J. (1937) secs. 3:3-4, 3:5-3; ORE. COMP. LAWS
(1940) secs. 16-101, 16-102.
71 PROBATE CODE OF CALIF. (1937) sec. 224; Comp. LAWS OF MICH.(1929) sec. 13440; REV. STAT. MO. (1939) sec. 306; REV. CODES OF
MONT. ANN. (1935) sec. 7073; N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW (Thomp-
son, 1939) chap. 18, sec. 83; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) sec. 101-4-5;
VA. CODE ANN. (1942) sec. 5264.
" ILL. REV. STAT. (1937) chap. 39, sec. 1; OKLA. STAT. (1941)
chap. 84, sec. 213.
'REV. CODE OF DEL. (1935) sec. 3731; REV. STAT. OF ME. (1930)
chap. 89, sec. 1; GEN. LAWS OF MASS. (1932) chap. 190, sec. 3; CODE
OF LAWS OF S. C. (1942) sec. 8906; TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams,
1934) sec. 8382 (realty only).
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SOME OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED
Which of the above groupings would seem to be best?
Should the surviving spouse be considered in the first instance?
Are the vast majority of the states progressive when they make
provision for the issue and their descendants in the first instance,
without also considering the spouse? All sorts of situations
can be imagined which make it very difficult to draw up a
fair and impartial statute. Suppose the surviving spouse is the
spouse of a second or later marriage? Suppose still further that
there are children by several marriages? Is there any reason
to distinguish between realty and personalty, between husband
and wife? Is there any reagon to allow all possible relations
to take, even the fifty-second cousin, in preference to the state?
Finally, we might ask, should the size of the estate have any
bearing upon the matter?
WHAT RELATIONS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO TAKE?
It would seem to this writer that perhaps it is best to per-
mit only the close relations to share in the estate of an intestate.
All lineal -descendants should certainly be permitted to share,
and the lineal ancestors through the parents and possibly
through the grandparents. While it is difficult to know at
exactly what point collaterals should be cut off, it is believed
that it need not go further than the grandchildren of brothers
and sisters, and that ascending collaterals should not share. In
the large majority of the cases, relations beyond these degrees
are not close to the decedent nor dependent upon him. In fact,
they may not even have been known to him, or have had any
interest in him or in his affairs, and should not therefore, take
under a statute of descent, there being a more deserving and
more needful heir at hand, namely the state.
"As the German's pungent phrase, 'der lachende Erbe'
(the laughing heir), so aptly indicates, succession by one who
is so loosely linked to his ancestor as to suffer no sense of
bereavement at his loss arouses a certain resentment in society.
His good fortune is begrudged as undeserved." 76 It is beyond
controversy that the American family is growing smaller and
SCavers, Change in the American Family and the "Laughing
Heir" (1934) 20 IOWA L. REv. 203, 208. This is a very timely and
worth-while article.
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that its ties are fewer and looser than they were even fifty years
ago. If we attempt to cling to our outmoded statutes and allow
all next of kin to share in a decedent's estate, we are going to
run into grave difficulties in regard to proof of relationship and
the locating of kin who may live in distant corners of the world,
as they well may with the world growing ever smaller due to
the rapid advancements which are taking place in transporta-
tion and communication and to the human being's desire for
that excitement and adventure which he finds when he dis-
covers new places and new faces. "Another argument, which
would not be without weight to those who deal in real estate,
is that a restriction of the class of those entitled to succession
would remove an important source of uncertainty in titles to
land. . . . Investigations to determine those entitled to suc-
cession may be costly, and the internecine strife among compet-
ing claimants often delays the settlement of the estate. - .
Finally, to use the words of Professor Cavers, ". . . it is my
belief that there are in process changes in the structure of the
American family which, coupled with considerations of con-
venience, will force to the fore the question of the desirability
of drastic limitations on the right of remote kindred to suc-
cession upon intestacy. ' '7s
ESCHEAT
Regarding the matter of escheat in relation to the statutes
on descent of intestate property the states fall into several
rather clearly marked categories, as follows:
(1) Many of the states have provided that property which
is not claimed under the statute of descent should escheat to
'Id. at 211.
'"Id. at 205. Professor Cavers gives a pointed illustration from
life which argues strongly for the wisdom of cutting off remote
heirs. "Miss Wendel, an elderly recluse whose family had amassed
a fortune in New York realty, died in 1931, leaving the bulk of her
fortune to charity. Her executors in filing her will stated that she
left no relatives. . . . Some 2300 persons strove to establish
themselves as entitled to join in the assault on her will. In June,
1933, four claimants, conceded to be relatives in the fifth degree,
accepted $2,000,000 in consideration of their agreement not to con-
test the will. They are believed to have agreed to share this sum
with sixty or seventy relatives in the sixth, seventh, and eighth
degrees. . . . One claimant was convicted for having fabricated
evidence that he was the testatrix's brother's son, and Surrogate
Foley referred the activities of six other claimants to the Grievance
Committee of the Bar Association." Id. at 210, n. 16.
L.J.-5
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the state, but permit all next of kin to claim it before it does
escheat.7 9
(2) MVaryland provides that property shall escheat if
there are no relations within the fifth degree.80
(3) A few states have specifically provided that prop-
erty shall escheat to the state for the school fund, if there are
no next of kin to inherit.8 '
(4) There are, apparently, courts which assert presump-
tions against the escheating of property to the state 2"- It
is the belief of this writer that much good could be done
by allowing property to escheat to the state when there are no
close relations of the intestate to inherit. As to whether it is
wise to limit the property which eseheats to the state to use in
some special fund, or is best to permit it to go into the general
funds of the state is difficult to answer and beyond the scope
of this paper.
COMMIUNITY PROPERTY
The states in which community property is recognized, have
special statutes in regard to the descent and distribution of
it.83 Property in Kentucky is not held in this way and it is
• CODE OF ALA. (1940) chap. 16, sec. 1; PROBATE CODE OF CALIF.
(1937) sec. 231; GEN. STAT. OF CONN. (1930) secs. 4997, 4998; FLA.
STAT. (1941) sec. 731.33; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) sec. 14-118; ILL.
REV. STAT. (1937) chap. 39, sec. 1; CODE OF IOWA (1939) chap. 508,
sec. 12035; GEN. LAWS OF MASS. (1932) chap. 190, sec. 3; COMP. LAWS
OF MICH. (1929) sec. 13440; MINN. STAT. (1941) sec. 525.16; REV.
CODES OF MONT. ANN. (1935) sec. 7073; COMP. STAT. OF NEB. (1929)
chap. 30, sec. 102; NEV. COMP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) sec. 9859; COMP.
LAWS OF N. D. (1913) sec. 5743; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938)
sec. 10503-4; OKLA. STAT. (1941) chap. 84, sec. 213; ORE. COMP.
LAWS, (1940) sec. 16-101; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) chap. 20, sec.
137; S. D. CODE (1939) sec. 56.0104; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) sec.
101-4-5; REV. STAT. OF WASH. ANN. (Remington, 1932) sec. 1356;
W. VA. CODE ANN. (1943) sec. 4090 (personalty); Wis. STAT. (1943)
secs. 237.01, 318.03.
'ANN. CODE OF MD. (Flack, 1939) art. 93, sec. 143.
M COMP. LAWS OF MICH. (1929) sec. 13440; S. D. CODE (1939) sec.
56.0104; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) sec. 101-4-5; WIs. STAT. (1943)
secs. 237.01, 318.03.
" Danks v. Herrmann, 94 Colo. 546, 31 P. 2d 912 (1934); Dutton
v. Donahue, 44 Wyo. 52, 8 P. 2d 90 (1932).
=ARiz. CODE ANN. (1939) chap. 39, secs. 101, 102 (on separate
estate) and chap. 39, sec. 109 (on community property); PROBATrE
CODE OF CALIF. (1937) secs. 201, 202, 203 (on community property)
and secs. 221-231 (on separate estate); IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) sec.
14-103 (on separate estate) and sec. 14-113 (on community prop-
erty); NEV. COMP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) sec. 9859 (on separate es-
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submitted by the writer that it would not be wise to adopt that
system; however, it is interesting to note that the statutes in
the states which do recognize community property vary almost
as greatly as do the other statutes on descent. In California,
for instance, one half of the community property belongs to the
surviving spouse, and also the other half, although it is subject
to the debts and the testamentary disposition of the first spouse
to die.8 4 On the other hand, in New Mexico, a distinction is
made between the husband and the wife, the surviving husband
receiving the entirety subject to such portion as may have been
set apart to the wife by a judicial decree,8 5 while the surviving
wife receives only one half of the property, the other half being
subject to the testamentary disposition of the husband, or that
failing, the wife is allowed one fourth the husband's half, the
remainder going in equal shares to the children. 6 Differing
from either of the two mentioned above, is the Washington
statute which gives one half of the community property to the
surviving spouse subject to debts, the other half descending
equally to the issue of the decedent or to their representatives.8 7
DISTRIBUTION BASED UPON WHICH SPOUSE SURVIVES
Of importance in all states is the question of whether there
should be any distinction between the share the spouse takes
depending upon whether it is the husband or the wife that
survives. WVhile some of the statutes still do make a distine-
tion,', it would seem that they are very definitely in the
minority and that their statutes are mere survivals of a past
age. We have come a long way from the days of feudalism.
Married women are no longer looked upon as being handicapped
by that relational and mental incapacity which they were once
considered to possess. They may now own property in their
tate) and secs. 3364, 3365 (on community property); N. M. STAT.
ANN. (1941) secs. 31-108, 31-109, 31-116 (on community property)
and secs. 31-110, 31-111, 31-112, 31-113, 31-114, 31-115 (on separate
estate); TEX. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) secs. 2570, 2571 (on separate
estate) and secs. 2578, 2579 (on community property); REV. STAT. OF
WASH. ANN. (Remington, 1932) sec. 1341 (on separate estate) and
sec. 1342 (on community property).
' PROBATE CODE OF CALIF. (1937) secs. 201, 202, 203.
8rN. M. STAT. ANN. (1941) sec. 31-108.
'" Id. sec. 31-109.
"7 REV. STAT. OF WASH. ANN. (Remington, 1932) sec. 1342.
"REV. LAWS OF N. H. (1942) chap. 359, secs. 11, 13; GEN. STAT.
OF N. C. (1934) sec. 28-149.
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own names and contract as femmes soles in regard to it. Why
should the husband be allowed a greater interest in his wife's
property than she in his? While many women have gone into
business on their own, there is still a vast majority of them that
would find difficulty in readjusting themselves from house-
keepers to wage earners, should they be left without any prop-
erty or means of support. The greater number of women who
are left widows, in normal times, are women who have passed
the prime of life and so would find it rather difficult to learn
some occupation that would fit them for a position. While
this is true it would seem that the wife should not receive any
greater share of her husband's estate than he receives from
hers; but rather, it appears that the husband and wife should
share equally in the estates of one another. Specifically, it is
believed that Kentucky Revised Statutes, section 391.030 sub-
sections (1) (c), (2), and (3) or any similar statute enacted in
their place, ought to be for the benefit of the husband as well as
for the wife. 89
PROPOSALS FOR DISTRIBUTION
Of no little difficulty is the problem of setting up an order
of descent which will be fair to all persons concerned. It is be-
lieved that the size of the estate, whether or not there are
issue, second or later marriages, and if there are no issue, the
nearness or remoteness of the next of kin, should be considered.
Statutes should not be so long and cumbersome that they serve
no other purpose than to cause litigation, but a clear and some-
what detailed statute upon the subject of descent would be an
improvement and benefit both socially and to the individual.
It is the opinion of this writer that the surviving spouse
ought to be considered in the first instance. A number of the
states allow the spouse, where there are no issue, to take a lump
sum, or property equivalent to a given sum, plus a given frac-
tion of the surplus above that sum, the remainder passing in
specified ways.90 As do all other statutes on descent, these
9Supra pages 280-281.
" CODE OF IOWA (1939) chap. 508, sec. 12017; GEN. LAWS OF MASS.
(1932) chap. 190, sec. 1; COMP. LAWS OF N. D. (1913, as amended
1915) sec. 5743; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) chap. 20, sec. 11; S. D.
CODE (1939) sec. 56.0104; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) sec. 101-4-5; PuB.
LAWS OF VT. (1933) sec. 2966; Wyo. REV. STAT. ANN. (1931) sec.
88-4001.
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vary in their terms from state to state. Iowa, for instance,
gives to the surviving spouse, if there are no issue, the whole
estate to the value of $7500 after the payment of debts, and one
half of all of the estate in excess of this amount, the remaining
one half of the excess going to the parents. 91  Massachusetts is
not so liberal, giving to the spouse the whole of the estate if it
does not exceed $5000 in value, otherwise allowing him the
$5000, plus one half of the remaining real and personal prop-
erty.9 2 North Dakota, on the other hand, is more generous,
allowing the surviving spouse all of the estate if it does not ex-
ceed $15,000 in value, plus one half of all property above the
allowance, the remainder going equally to the parents or the
survivor of them, or if neither of them is living to the brothers
and sisters and their issue by representation.9 3 South Dakota's
statute is identical with the one of her sister state to the north
except that she allows the surviving spouse $20,000 rather than
$15,000. 94 This serves to indicate the difficulty that has been
found in fixing a sum or value that will be judicious in all
cases. In spite of the difficulty involved, it appears to this
writer that it would be a logical and practical system to in-
itiate and develop, as situations change, not only in Kentucky,
but in all of the states which do not have it. Why could not
this system be worked out in detail to apply both where there
are and are not children or issue and also to cases where there
is a second or later spouse?
The following situations and solutions occur to this writer;
and are submitted as an outline or guide in drawing a new
statute upon the subject.
(1) If there is a first spouse, but no children or issue of
children, it does not seem unjust to permit the surviving spouse
to inherit absolutely all of the real and personal property
earned during coverture, subject, of course, to debts, plus one
half of the residue, not so earned, the other one half going to
the parents, or the survivor of them, or if none, to the brothers
and sisters and their descendants, per stirpes, or if all are in the
1 Supra note 90.
" Id.
* Id.
Id.
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same degree of relationship to the decedent, per capita. (See
above as to cutting off representation.) 95
(2) If there is a first spouse and issue, the spouse could
be given a lump sum, say, for example, $10,000, in addition to
the home and furnishings of whatever value, plus a life interest
in all of the residue, the remainder being divided equally among
the children and their issue by representation, unless all are in
the same degree of relationship, in which case they should take
per capita. It would appear to be wise to allow the spouse a
power of sale and of reinvestment should necessity and sound
discretion require it in order to preserve the value and best
interests of the estate. Of course, there are various views upon
the matter, but, generally speaking, it can be said that husband
and wife accumulate property, often through their joint efforts,
not only for their own benefit and pleasure during their lives,
but also with an eye towards the benefit and aid of their issue.
Thus a life interest only, in the surviving spouse in all of the
estate above a given sum and the home would seem likely to
fulfill their wishes.
(3) If there is a second spouse and no children or issue
by either marriage, but parents, or brothers or sisters of the in-
testate or their issue, there seems to be no sound reason for not
following the same provisions as set forth by this writer under the
first section in this list.
(4) If there is a spouse, but no children as issue, and no
parents, brothers or sisters or their descendants, all should go
to the spouse regardless of the source.
(5) If there is a second spouse and issue.surviving by the
first spouse, it would appear to be socially expedient to allow
the spouse a certain sum absolutely with a life interest in the
home if acquired during the first marriage of the decedent,
otherwise an absolute interest, and a given percentage of the
residue depending upon its size, and during which marriage it
was acquired, the remainder going equally to the children and
their issue per stirpes, or per capita, if all are in the same de-
gree of relationship. As in the case of a first spouse it would
seem to be proper to allow the spouse only a certain percentage
of the property which the decedent acquired before marriage,
the residue passing to the issue of the first marriage.
Supra pages 274-276.
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(6) If there is a second spouse and issue by both mar-
riages, the spouse should be allowed a given sum absolutely
as above, the home if acquired during that marriage, with a
life interest in all of the residue earned during the marriage, the
remainder passing equally to all of the issue of both marriages.
As in the case of a first spouse the second or later spouse should
be entitled to a given percentage of the estate acquired before
marriage, the residue passing to the issue.
CONCLUSION
To tie all of the many loose ends of this paper together, it
is submitted that in view of the developing times and the great
number of persons that are involved, that the several sections
of the Kentucky statutes on the descent and distribution of
intestate property should be completely revised. Specifically,
it is believed that there is no sound reason to distinguish be-
tween real and personal property, but rather that one statute
which would cover the two would be sufficient. It would also
seem that states which make no distinction in the descent of
property because of its source of inheritance have the proper
provisions upon that matter, that all property, regardless of
whether it is ancestral or not, should follow the same order of
descent. It appears further that there should be no distinction
between those of the whole blood and those of the half blood,
whether or not the claimants are lineal or collateral relations
of the intestate.
Perhaps the section most in need of change is that respect-
ing per stirpes distribution. Certainly if those who are to take
under the statute are all in the same degree of lineal relation-
ship to the intestate they should all share equally in his estate,
and per stirpes distribution should be limited to cases in which
the next of kin are not in the same degree of relationship to the
decedent. It may be that collateral inheritance should follow
the same rule in all respects. Whether a nephew should be
preferred to an uncle raises a question of the priority of one
stirpes over another rather than that of distribution per capita.
Finally, and most important, the order of succession should
be carefully considered and revised. It is submitted that a
graduated scale which would take into consideration the size of
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the estate and the heirs who are to inherit, whether there is a
spouse with no issue or parents surviving, or whether there are
issue, or perhaps a second or later spouse. Equitably, doubtless
both the issue and the surviving spouse should be considered
in the first instance and it should make no difference in the
order or amount allowed whether it is the husband or the wife
that survives. If there are no issue but there are parents and a
spouse surviving, it would seem just to allow the parents a
portion of the estate, the size of such portion depending upon
the size of the estate, and the amount of it acquired during the
marriage. (In all situations this should be a consideration.)
If there are no parents or issue and the estate is relatively
small, then the spouse should take all. On the other hand, if
the estate is large and a spouse and brothers and sisters survive
but no parents or issue, perhaps they should all share, the
spouse taking the largest portion. If there is no spouse, the
issue should inherit the entire estate, it being distributed equal-
ly between them; or if some are deceased and leave issue sur-
viving them, then the issue should share per stirpes with the
surviving children of the intestate, but per capita among them-
selves. If there are no issue and no spouse then the parents
and the brothers and sisters and their issue should share their
portions, depending to some extent upon the size of the estate.
It would seem, that the parents should be preferred to the
brothers and sisters. Lastly it is firmly believed that schools,
colleges or state supported eleemosynary institutions could
be benefited greatly if the state were by statute made an heir
in preference to remote relations. Where the relationship is
less remote it might be wise and equitable to allow the court
a certain amount of discretion in apportioning the shares. In
such case the court may be able to make apportionments in the
light of the needs and deserts of the claimants in the exercise
of a wise discretion and under appropriate rules and safeguards.
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